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Cumulative Carbon and Just Allocation of the Global
Carbon Commons
R.T. Pierrehumbert*

Abstract
Recent research has shown that the effect of human activities on climate can be
characterited by a single statistic, called cumulative carbon. This statistic is the aggregate
amount of carbon emitted in theform of carbon dioxide by activities such asfossilfuel burning
and deforestadon over the entire time such activitiespersist. In thispaper the concept is used to
address the question offair allocation of carbon emissions amongst nations or other emitting
units. It is concluded that even ifemissionspriorto theyear 2000 are left out of the accounting,
North America would have a just obligation to cease emissions completely in thirteenyears,
even if the emissions rate were froZen at its current level. China, India, and other developing
nations could continue emissions for much longer before exhausting theirfair share of the
Carbon Commons. If historical emissions are fully taken into account, North America
exceeded itsfair share of usage in 1970, and has been in carbon overdraft ever since, whereas
none of the major nations of the developing world have yet exceeded theirfair shares. It is
concluded that, based on prinafples of human equality, North America, and inparticularthe
US, has a strong moral obligation to take the lead in actions thatwill ultimatey reduce global
carbon emissions. Western Europe has similar oblgations, but has begun measures to take on
afair share of responsibilityfor emissions reduction, whereas such action has been largey absent
in North America.

Louis Block Professor in Geophysical Sciences at The University of Chicago.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the climate problem, there is a clear goal for a theory of justice: first to
reduce the growth rate of global carbon dioxide emissions, and ultimately to
bring them to zero before they commit the Earth to an unacceptable degree of
climate disruption. We are not interested in abstract notions of who may deserve
to be punished. There is a job to be done and, while finding a just solution is
only a part of the process, it probably does play some role in persuading all
parties to act in their mutual interest. Nations will rarely do anything that goes
much against perceived self-interest just because it is the right thing to do, but
on the other hand, in the absence of military coercion, nations will mightily
avoid agreeing to restrictions they perceive (rightly or wrongly) as unjust.
Finding a solution to the threat of global climate change involves
distribution of a valuable and scarce resource, the global Carbon Commons. It
engages issues of equity between rich and poor (both within nations and across
national boundaries), and between present and future generations. We also need
to find principles for dealing with past emissions, in order to determine how
much of the commons has been "used up," and how the unused portion of the
commons should be allocated. These are quintessentially ethical problems. First,
we need to clarify the nature of the resource being distributed.
II. THE GLOBAL CARBON COMMONS
When carbon is emitted into the air in the form of carbon dioxide
(generally as a result of burning fossil fuels or as a consequence of
deforestation), over time it is repartitioned among the atmosphere, the ocean,
and the near-surface materials of the land. That portion that remains in the
atmosphere causes global warming and other forms of climate disruption, while
that portion that enters the ocean causes ocean acidification. Allocation of the
global Carbon Commons requires us to know the relation between climaterelevant emissions and climate change.
Other significant greenhouse gases-notably methane-also contribute to
global warming, but these do not merit consideration on an equal footing with
CO 2 because their persistence in the atmosphere is so short. For example, since
methane has an atmospheric lifetime of only twelve years, we can delay methane
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controls for two centuries if we wish, and still get the full benefit of reduction of
methane emissions within a few decades of implementation of controls. The
same cannot be said for CO2, as we shall see shortly. The commonly used
practice of aggregating short-lived and long-lived greenhouse gases through their
Global Warming Potential leads to highly erroneous policy guidance, and should
be abandoned.'
Recent research has shown that the magnitude of climate change, as
measured by global mean warming, is very well characterized by a simple metric
known as cumulative carbon.2 Cumulative carbon is simply the net carbon
emitted globally over the period of time during which human activities continue
to contribute a net input of carbon (as CO) to the Earth system-more or less
the duration of the fossil fuel era. The key results regarding cumulative carbon
are as follows:
* The global mean warming is linearly proportional to cumulative carbon.
* The amount of warming at the time emissions cease is nearly
independent of the emissions trajectory over which the cumulative
carbon is emitted.
* The amount of warming at the time emissions cease persists for about a
thousand years, and declines only very gradually over the next ten
thousand years, and still more slowly over the following several hundred
thousand years.
Cumulative carbon is usually quoted in terms of gigatonnes (billions of
metric tonnes) of carbon. The linearity property is very important in thinking
about allocation, because the contribution of individual entities to climate
damage-be they nations or persons-can be characterized by the amount of
cumulative carbon they contribute to the total. To determine the size of the
usable Carbon Commons, we must determine (by a process of negotiation) the
maximum allowable warming that can be tolerated, and then translate that into a
cumulative carbon number. Because climate change is nearly independent of
emissions trajectory, there is little point in arguing about details of when an
entity chooses to emit its fair allocation of carbon.
The fact that it is the cumulative amount of carbon that counts for climate
change derives from the very long lifetime of CO 2 in the atmosphere. It
accumulates in the atmosphere, rather like mercury in the fat of a fish, and leads

I

See Susan Solomon, et al, Atmospheric Composition, Irreversible Climate Change, and Miigation Poli, in

J. Hurrell and G. Asrar, eds, Climate Sdence for Serving Society: Research, Modelling and PredictionPriorities
2

(Springer 2012).
For background on cumulative carbon see, for example, David Archer, The Long Thaw (Princeton
2008); Susan Solomon, et al, Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106
Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 1704 (2009).
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to essentially irreversible changes in the climate. Before proceeding to the
question of usage and allocation of the Carbon Commons, we will digress to
summarize the basic science leading to the connection between climate change
and cumulative carbon.4
During the first ten thousand years after emissions, the main sink for
anthropogenic CO 2 iS uptake by the ocean. In order to store a significant amount
of carbon in the ocean, it must be mixed from the surface layers into the deep
ocean, and this takes about a thousand years. Moreover, the ocean can only store
significant amounts of carbon by converting it from dissolved CO 2 to
bicarbonate (the same substance found in baking soda), which involves some
chemistry that has nonlinearities in it. The upshot is that the fraction of emitted
carbon that stays in the air as CO 2 once the atmosphere-ocean system has come
into chemical equilibrium increases with the cumulative carbon emitted. A
calculation of the air fraction-based on the very simple equilibrium carbon
model in Princilesof Planetary Cimate-is shown in the upper panel of Figure 1,
where the amount in the atmosphere is expressed as Gigatonnes Carbon (GtC).'
It is seen that the atmospheric CO2 is concave upward as a function of
cumulative carbon. However, the radiative forcing that drives climate change is
logarithmic, and hence concave downward, as a function of atmospheric CO 2.
These two nonlinearities very nearly cancel, leading to a linear relation between
temperature increase and cumulative carbon, as shown in the lower panel of
Figure 1.

3
4

Archer, The Long Thaw at 122-23 (cited in note 2); Solomon, 106 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci at
1705-06 (cited in note 2).
For a more complete review of the subject, see National Research Council, Clmate Stabifitation
Targets: Emissions, Concentrations and Impacts over Decades to Millennia 83-97 (National Academies
2011).

5

Raymond T. Pierrehumbert, Principles ofPlanetary Climate 497-597 (Cambridge 2010).

6

To put this in more familiar units, 100 GtC in the atmosphere translates into approximately fortysix parts per million CO 2.
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Figure 1: Upper pane GtC in air (as CO) versus GIC emitted. Calculationis based on carbon added to a
280ppmv atmospheric pre-industrialbaseline, assumed to be in equilibrium with the ocean. The airfraction
represents the amount left in the atmosphere after the ocean and atmosphere have equilibrated, but before ocean
acidification has been buffered by dissolution of carbonate (limestone)from land and the seafloor. Lower panel:
Correspondingpeak global mean warming based on a climate sensitiviy chosen to match the simulations ofAllen
et al (2009).7 This sensitivity is approximatel equivalent to the median sensitivity in the ensemble of models
included in the IntergovernmentalPanelon Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report.

The deep ocean warms and approaches thermal equilibrium on the same
one thousand year time scale as it draws down CO 2 following the cessation of
emissions. The net result is that atmospheric temperature remains fairly flat over
the thousand years following the end of emissions. This is illustrated in Figure 2,
where we show the modeled CO 2 and temperature trajectories resulting from
releasing 1700 GtC cumulative carbon over an emissions trajectory that brings
emissions to zero by the year 2250.9 The temperature time series would be
virtually identical even if all the cumulative carbon were emitted in a pulse over a
single year, owing to the thermal smoothing effects of the ocean.1o

7

Myles R. Allen, et al, Warming Caused ly Cumulative Carbon Emissions Towards the Trillionth Tonne, 458
Nature 1163, 1163-64 (2009).

8

David A. Randall, et al, Climate Models and Their Evaluation, in Susan Solomon, et al, eds, Climate
Change 2007: The PhysicalScience Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the FourthAssessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 608-44 (Cambridge 2007), online at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-chapter8.pdf
(visited Nov 16,
2012).

9

The atmospheric CO2 trajectory is taken from the carbon cycle model discussed in Michael Eby,
et al, Lifetime of Anthropogenic Climate Change: Millennial Time Scales of Potential CO2 and Surface
Temperature Perturbations,22 J Climate 2501, 2502-04 (2009). The corresponding temperature is
computed using the two-box climate model described in Solomon, et al, Atmospheric Composition at
25 (Springer 2012) (cited in note 1).

10

Eby, et al, 22 J Climate at 2510 (cited in note 9).
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Figure 2: Time series of atmorpheric CO2 concentration and global mean atmospheric temperature resuling
from emission of 1700 GtC up to theyear 2250,followed bj Cessation of emissions.

Over the next ten thousand years (not shown), carbonate (basically
limestone) will dissolve from sediments and wash into the ocean in rivers,
buffering the oceans' acidity and allowing a bit more carbon to be taken up,
leading to a modest reduction in temperature." Figure 3 shows how the future
climate looks as a function of global cumulative carbon emitted, based on the
median IPCC climate sensitivity; there is a fifty-fifty chance things would be
worse for any given amount of cumulative carbon. If we adopt a 50 percent
chance of global mean warming of 2 0 C or more as our climate target for the
sake of discussion, that translates into an allowable total emission of about a
trillion tonnes of carbon. This serves as a measure of the size of the Carbon
Commons. 12

11

National Research Council, Climate Stabiliation Targets at 75 (cited in note 4).

12

Allen, et al, 458 Nature at 1163 (cited in note 8).
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Figure 3: Global mean temperature out to the year 12000, as afunction of cumulative carbon emitted during
the periodoffossilfuel usage.

Our discussion of cumulative carbon so far was based only on uptake of
CO 2 by the ocean, but terrestrial ecosystems also intercept some of the emitted
carbon and store it in living biomass and near-surface soil carbon-between 1
and 3 GtC per year at present.13 The behavior of this part of the carbon cycle is
far less well understood than the oceanic carbon sink, which mostly depends on
fairly basic physical and chemical principles. The terrestrial carbon sink is a
delicate balance between the increase in carbon uptake by photosynthesis
(stimulated by increasing atmospheric C0 2 , and by inadvertent and deliberate
reforestation or changes in agricultural practices) and a nearly equally large
change in the release of CO 2 from decomposition of dead biomass and soil
organic carbon. The future of this sink is uncertain; warming tends to enhance
decomposition and it takes little change in the balance to turn the net sink into a
net source, releasing the carbon we have recently been storing in soils, and

13

Richard A. Houghton, Balandng the Global Carbon Budget, 35 Ann Rev Earth Planetary Sci 313,
316-17 (2007). This estimate excludes the net source due to land use changes such as
deforestation or afforestation projects, which are accounted for as part of the net non-fossil fuel
anthropogenic source of carbon. It is intended to represent the response of the land biosphere to
changed atmospheric conditions.
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perhaps even more than that.14 The carbon cycle models used in Figures 2 and 3
do in fact include a terrestrial carbon module that tends to return to the
atmosphere the carbon stored in soils in the first century or so. This part of the
carbon cycle needs to be relegated to the domain of known unknowns, and apart
from saying that it would be hazardous to rely on continued near-surface storage
of carbon that is very subject to oxidation by bacteria that have had two billion
years to get good at making use of available organic carbon, there is little that
can be said with certainty.
How much of the Carbon Commons has been used up already, and who
used it? Figure 4 shows the cumulative emissions for four representative regions
(two in the developed world and two in the developing world), together with the
net global value." The four regions chosen make up more than half of the world
total cumulative emissions. Globally, about a third of the trillion-tonne Carbon
Commons has already been used up by fossil fuel burning alone. It is clear that
the developed regions (North America and Western Europe plus Germany)
have used a far larger share of the Carbon Commons than the developing world
regions (centrally planned Asia plus Far East Asia-think China and India).
China may have overtaken us as an emitter, with India not far behind, but while
the cumulative emissions of both regions are growing rapidly at present rates of
growth, they will not overtake North American cumulative emissions until
roughly 2040.

14

Eby, et al, 22 J Climate at 2502-04 (cited in note 9).

15

Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions, US Department of
Energy (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, last updated Sept 26, 2012), online at
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/methireg.html (visited Oct 14, 2012); all carbon emissions
data are derived from the files distributed at http://cdiac.ornl/gov/.
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Land use changes attributable to human activity (mainly deforestation)
have also added CO 2 to the atmosphere-approximately 150 GtC as of 2005.6
This source, however, is not growing as fast as the fossil fuel source, and indeed
cannot grow for much longer before we run out of forests to cut down.
Including this source in the regional inventory could somewhat shift the
contributions of the various regions to cumulative carbon, but we have left it out
of the picture in part because historical land use carbon emissions are subject to
considerable uncertainty (especially if one wishes to factor in the large source of
carbon due to deforestation during the European colonization of North
America). Besides that, deforestation creates opportunities for future carbon
sinks due to reforestation, provided the land has not become so degraded that it
can no longer support forest growth. To the extent that nations avail themselves
of this fairly rapid (though limited) carbon sink, the net effects of deforestation
are a wash.
The ocean is not a long-term sink of carbon. The carbon added to the
system is re-partitioned between an ever-growing air fraction and an oceanic
fraction, but so long as emissions exceed the minuscule rate that can be
absorbed by the very slow processes, which convert CO 2 to limestone on land,
the atmospheric carbon dioxide will continue to grow. Thus, to prevent
continued warming, everybody's emission of fossil fuel carbon needs to fall
essentially to zero at some point,17 and before an unacceptable value of
cumulative carbon has been reached. The Carbon Commons is not a renewable
resource. Allocating it is not like divvying up fishing rights in the world ocean.
When it comes to carbon, there is no sustainable catch. If fish were like carbon,
everybody would need to give up fishing eventually, and those who caught more
fish in the past would have fed themselves at the expense of others.
III. PRINCIPLES FOR JUST ALLOCATION OF THE
CARBON COMMONS
As recounted by Judith Shklar, Aristotle saw greed as the basic driver of
injustice," and his theory of distributive or normal justice was largely based on
the need for an orderly process to keep greed from running rampant.
Subsequent thinking may have broadened our understanding of the wellsprings
of injustice, but it seems to me that greed, and the need to keep it in check,

16
17

18

Id.
H. Damon Matthews and Ken Caldeira, StabiAing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 35
Geophysical Rsrch Letters 1, 4-5 (2008).
Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice 28 (Yale 1990).
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serves very nicely as the basis for discussion of just allocation of the Carbon
Commons.
The moral philosopher Peter Singer identified three generally recognized
principles of justice that could be applied to the allocation of the Carbon
Commons, and explained them in terms of an analogy with a series of lakeshore
villages all of which dump pollution into a lake they rely on for fish." These
principles have a certain affinity with the notion of greed as the root of injustice.
I will reformulate them and make them quantitative in terms of cumulative
carbon.
The first of the three alternate principles is Polluter Pays, which can be
paraphrased as "you broke it, you fix it." In the village analogy, it implies that
the village that dumped the most sewage bears a proportionate bulk of the
responsibility for cleaning up the mess. In the context of the Carbon Commons,
there being no practical way to "fix" the climate by removing a significant
proportion of past emissions from the atmosphere, fixing the problem largely
means accepting an obligation to pay the costs required to reduce future
emissions somewhere in the world. As they occur, new emissions are simply
added to past emissions and increase the obligation to pay at a per tonne rate
equal to that applied to past emissions. One can think of these payments as
going into a fund used for such purposes as paying for replacement of inefficient
refrigerators, air conditioners, and furnaces, replacing coal fired power plants
with wind, solar, or nuclear energy and the like. Such payments should not be
regarded as a fine or penalty, since the purpose is not punitive, but the
distinction is fuzzy since-like a fine-the payments make harmful behavior
more costly, and thus have value in inhibiting such behavior.
By the Polluter Pays standard, Figure 4 demonstrates that North America
has a greater obligation to reduce its emissions rate (or to pay for equivalent
reductions elsewhere) than centrally planned Asia. In fact, even if North
America instantly reduced its emissions to zero, it would not be until 2030 that
centrally planned Asia caught up to an equal degree of obligation, at its present
rate of cumulative emissions growth.
Singer's second principle, which we will call Equal Future Shares, is
prospective rather than retrospective. Each individual alive in some baseline year
is a tabula rasa, free from any responsibility for carbon emitted in the past, and
with an equal entitlement to a share of the allowable global future emissions. As
Singer notes,20 it is desirable to base per capita allocations on population in a
baseline year, or some other target population number, so as to provide an
19

20

Peter Singer, Ethics and Chmate Change: A CommentaU on MacCracken, Toman and Gardiner,15 Envir
Values 415, 418-19 (2006).
Peter Singer, One Work The Ethics of Globaitiadon35-36 (Yale 2002).
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incentive for measures (hopefully benign) that moderate population growth.21
Equal Future Shares is usually thought of as allocating blocks of emissions rights
to nations in proportion to their baseline population, but if the right kind of
global emissions market could be established, there is no real reason not to issue
shares directly to individuals. There is much to be said for that, in terms of
increasing flexibility and endowing individuals with more freedom to choose
how their personal allocation is used, and how much should be left to
descendants.
Making allowance for the portion of the Carbon Commons used up by
past land use changes (basically deforestation) and dividing up the roughly 500
GtC remaining over the year 2012 world population yields an allocation of about
70 tonnes of carbon per person, which could be augmented to the extent that an
individual participates in successful reforestation projects. At the present rate of
North American emission, this would be used up in only thirteen years, even
without allowing for future growth in the emissions rate. Regardless of where
the obligations of North Americans stand relative to the developing world, it is
clear that we would need to be doing far more than we currently are in order to
bear our fair share of the burden of decarbonizing the world economy. Under
Equal Future Shares, centrally planned Asia could continue to emit for several
decades at its current annual rate, but would still have considerable incentive to
reduce its emissions growth rate since the current rate of growth in the emissions
rate would exhaust its allocation in not too long a time (roughly thirty years,
given a sustained 5 percent annual growth rate, versus fifty-six years if the
emissions rate is frozen at its 2008 value).
Neither of the preceding two principles invokes wealth redistribution as a
justification. Wealth redistribution from richer to poorer may be a side effect
insofar as the countries with greater historical cumulative carbon on the whole
tend to be richer and less populous, but the principles would yield the same
result even if this were not the case. That brings us to Singer's third principle,
which we will call Favor the Poor. Equal Future Shares treats all individuals
equally, but Favor the Poor adopts the premise of John Rawls that inequality in
treatment of individuals can be accepted to the extent that it benefits the least
advantaged individuals. This principle would allocate more emissions rights to
poorer individuals, or citizens of poorer nations than would be the case under
Equal Future Shares, thus further increasing the responsibility of the developed

21

In accepting an implied population cap for distributing the Carbon Commons, we are deviating
from a principle of strict human equality. Any humans born in excess of the cap are given a lower
share of the Commons, despite the fact that their so suffering was purely by accident of their
circumstances of birth. This should make us uncomfortable, as do many questions touching on
population policy.
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world to act on carbon mitigation relative to the developing world. It may be
objected that what Rawls mostly had in mind is something like the reverse-that
to a limited extent it may be acceptable to allow the rich to get richer, if their
greater productivity or creativity in use of resources winds up, through
subsequent distribution of the fruits of their labors, benefiting the poorest. That
objection is neatly taken care of if the carbon allocations are tradable, since the
rich would be free to buy emission rights from the poor at a high price, and still
profit from the transaction. In order for such transactions to have the intended
effect of reducing global emissions, there would need to be a mechanism in
place to assure that the funds received by the poor are indeed invested in
fulfilling their commitment to forgo the agreed amount of future emissions.
The Rawlsian scheme can also be justified by a Deepest Pockets
principle-those who can afford to pay for a shared benefit, with the least
suffering to their own well-being, should do so. This is the same principle that
justifies progressive tax codes.
The moral underpinnings of Polluter Pays are subtly different from those
of Equal Future Shares in that Polluter Pays is neutral with regard to the relative
populations of emitting nations or any other unit of aggregation we care to
employ. This neutrality is not manifestly absurd, since a tonne of carbon emitted
does the same damage to climate whether it is emitted by a large or small group
of individuals, or by an individual in a populous or sparsely populated nation.
Consider Nation A with a population of 100 million and Nation B with a
population of one billion, each of which has emitted 100 GtC. If it cost, for
example, $100 to avoid a tonne of future emissions, then each nation is required
to pay $10 trillion into the carbon mitigation fund to fully compensate for their
past emissions. For Nation A this comes out to $100,000 per person; for Nation
B the payment is $10,000 per person and (all other things being equal) would be
less burdensome. In that sense, the population issue seems to take care of itself
in Polluter Pays. A poor individual might be disproportionately harmed by even
the smaller per capita payment in the more populous nation, but that engages
the considerations of Deepest Pockets, not Polluter Pays or Equal Future
Shares. Polluter Pays even appears sound from a standpoint of human equality,
in that each individual is treated equally, and pays a fee for carbon emissions in
proportion to the damage caused by those emissions, without any differential in
per tonne rates amongst individuals. Polluter Pays is in this sense equivalent to a
fixed per tonne carbon tax levied globally without regard to the circumstances of
the emitters. Nonetheless, Polluter Pays has different implications from
application of some form of an Equal Future Shares principle, and these need to
be examined.
The problem with the ethical stance in Polluter Pays is that it fails to
recognize that carbon emission is not an incidental activity, but instead is
incurred as a result of an attempt to fulfill basic human needs that would tend to
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require a certain amount of energy expenditure per person. Polluter Pays assigns
equal culpability to everybody in proportion to the amount of carbon they have
emitted, but this is different from assigning equal rights to a share of the net
amount of carbon that can be emitted globally without incurring an
unacceptable degree of harm from climate change. For example, if it were
assumed that the allowable emissions, when divided equally amongst the citizens
of the two nations, were 100 tonnes per person, then the citizens of the
populous Nation B would owe nothing to the carbon mitigation fund, whereas
the citizens of Nation A would owe $90,000 each (the value of their emissions in
excess of the 100 tonne allowance). This is the outcome that would result from
applying the principle in Equal Future Shares to historical emissions. It is a very
different outcome from Polluter Pays, and is closer to the spirit of treating all
humans as endowed with equal rights to a commons that does not intrinsically
belong to one nation more than another.
In order to address this issue, I propose a hybrid between Polluter Pays
and Equal Future Shares, which I'll call Equal Total Shares. This principle is like
Equal Future Shares in being per capita based, but attempts to factor in past
carbon emissions. Based on the 2012 world population, the fair individual share
of the Carbon Commons is 143 tonnes, some of which has already been used by
our forebears. If past carbon emissions were allocated equally to all people alive
in the base year, then Equal Total Shares and Equal Future Shares would be
identical. However, some individuals have benefited more from past emissions
than others, so we can get a more just solution by taking that into account. By
way of example, let's do a per capita cumulative carbon accounting in which the
historical emissions of North America and centrally planned Asia are assigned to
the number of individuals in those regions alive in 2012. The results are shown
in Figure 5. By this measure, North Americans used up their fair allocation in
1970, and were 173 tonnes per person into carbon overdraft by 2005. In
contrast, centrally planned Asia will not have used its just allocation until 2040.
Again, we conclude that it would be just for North America to bear more of the
burden of reducing emissions than centrally planned Asia; indeed it would
appear that we owe somebody compensation for our overuse of the Carbon
Commons.
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Figure 5: Per capita cumulative carbon for North America and centrally planned Asia, based on 2012
baseline populations in each region. The horikontalline represents the per capitafair share of the global Carbon
Commons.

The rather extreme principle we have used for attributing past emissions is
based on the premise that the prosperity of a nation's citizens today represents
the accumulation of the fruits of past energy usage and its associated carbon
emissions. It could be argued, with considerable justification, that a person
should not be liable for his grandfather's carbon emissions, let alone that of his
earlier forebears. Even more so, it could be argued that an immigrant to the US
from Africa should not be saddled with a full share of the US carbon overdraft.
These are serious issues that any allocation of past emissions must confront.
Perhaps there should be a statute of limitations for carbon emission. This cannot
be justified on the basis of ignorance of consequences of carbon emissions,
since that has been known for well over a century, but one could perhaps find
justification to write down some of the past carbon debt on the grounds that the
benefits accrued from sufficiently early emissions are dispersed. As the cutoff of
the statute of limitations for carbon approaches the present, Equal Total Shares
and Equal Future Shares become identical. However, since so much of the
carbon has been emitted relatively recently, putting the cutoff date at 1950,
which includes the lifetime of the parents of most developed-world persons alive
today, that date would still leave the developed world with a considerable carbon
overdraft.
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None of the principles we have discussed for just allocation of the Carbon
Commons invokes retribution as a guiding principle. The aim is not to cause the
guilty parties to suffer, so it is perfectly acceptable if the richer villages take care
of the problem by investing in pollution reduction in the poorer villages.
Based on Figure 5, at a price of $100 per tonne of carbon, each North
American would owe $17,300 for his or her share of the national carbon
overdraft. Payment of this debt need not take the form of a direct wealth
transfer to nations that have not used their allocation. It could instead be
interpreted as the amount we are obligated to invest in developing and
implementing technological means to decarbonize our economy, with possible
spinoffs to other economies. I have no real expectation that North Americans
would agree to taking on an investment of this magnitude any time soon, but
one should at least not deceive oneself into thinking that we are declining this
responsibility out of any valid sense of injustice, rather than simple unimpeded
greed.
It may well be that President George W. Bush was speaking for a majority
of the American people when he said, with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, "We
will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first are the
people who live in America." 22 Perhaps the American political consciousness is
wired in such a way that any international agreement perceived as reducing the
growth of American prosperity (no matter how rich it still leaves us)
automatically triggers a sense of injustice. Shklar distinguishes between the sense
of injustice and actual injustice, but cautions that all feelings of injustice have a
claim to be examined.2 3 I do not propose to fathom the source of the peculiarly
American sense of injustice (if that is indeed what it is) when asked to do
something about climate change. But we must not accord the American sense of
injustice any greater claim to be examined than the Chinese sense of injustice,
since after all, the Chinese must also be persuaded to sign on to any global
carbon emissions protocol if it is to be useful. Why would the Chinese or Indian
governments, on behalf of their people, agree to such a manifestly unjust treaty
as Posner and Weisbach would seem to wish on them? Stripped of fancy
terminology, the proposal of Posner and Weisbach is essentially a Victim Pays
model, in which costs of CO 2 abatement are levied according to who suffers the
most harm from them, rather than who is responsible for the damage. 24 These
costs are levied on the victims even if the victims are predominantly poorer than
22
23
24

Singer, 15 Envir Values at 415 (cited in note 19).
See discussion in Shklar, The Faces of Injustice at 90 (cited in note 18).
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice 6-7, 178-81, 183-84 (Princeton 2010).
The surplus referred to by Posner and Weisbach includes the value of harms to the victims that
are avoided if the victims join in a climate change treaty.
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the perpetrators. The victims are supposed to sign on eagerly because they will
be even worse off if they do not. Perhaps if the US plays a game of chicken with
climate in which China swerves to avoid the crash, we will win. That may be
good gamesmanship, but we should not fool ourselves into thinking it has
anything to do with justice. There are, moreover, hazards in exploiting victims,
even if they are in such a poor bargaining position that the best deal they can get
is a manifestly unjust one. Faced with such a choice, maltreated victims may well
retaliate by deciding to trash the climate and take everybody down with them,
even though that would not be in their own self-interest. The story of Kullervo
in the Finnish national epic Kalevala provides a sobering reminder of the
widespread death and destruction that can ensue from neglecting the needs of a
victim by accident of birth. 25 The tragedy that beset the US at the dawn of the
twenty-first century likewise reminds us of the global danger posed by failed
states, and it takes little imagination to quake at the prospect of nuclear-armed
Pakistan and India facing off under the stress of a late twenty-first century crop
failure provoked by climate change.
At the same time we acknowledge the essential justice of according more
emissions rights to the developing world than to the developed world, we must
acknowledge the importance of avoiding purely quixotic actions. If the
industrialized world stops emitting carbon but China and India pick up the slack,
it will not serve the purpose of protecting the climate. That would be like
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. It may satisfy some sense of justice to
give the steerage passengers a chance to lounge on the first class deck before the
ship goes down, but it would be better to get everybody into lifeboats. Getting
the developed world to agree to just emissions caps is only part of the
negotiating strategy needed to bring the rest of the world into a controlledcarbon regime.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis confirms and consolidates Singer's conclusion that under a
broad range of generally recognized and intuitively appealing principles of
justice, the first world-and especially North America-has the greatest
obligation to aggressively reduce carbon emissions. This conclusion applies even
if we write down all carbon emissions before 2008 and even without factoring
wealth redistribution into the equation for social justice. But that does not mean
the first world can go it alone, since it is global emissions that count, and the
problem cannot be solved without a regime that can persuade the developing
world-especially India/Pakistan and China-to bring down their carbon

25

Elias Lonnrot, The Kalevala: Epic ofthe FinnishPeople 257-62 (Otava 1988) (Eino Friberg, trans).
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emissions as well. Developed world citizens are being asked to give up a real
benefit in order to serve the goal of climate justice, and giving up this benefit
conflicts with a legitimate desire to protect the interests of nation and familythose nearest and dearest. If an agreement is to be reached on the basis of
considerations of justice and human equality, there must be the strictest possible
assurances that what is given up actually advances the goal of protecting the
climate for everybody's future benefit.
Posner and Weisbach's proposal is in essence a Victim Pays model and, in
contrast to any of Singer's principles, justifies relatively more inaction by the first
world at the expense of the developing world. It could be argued that the moral
status of Victim Pays is no more arbitrary than that of Polluter Pays (which rests
on a weak presumption of human equality) or Equal Future Shares or Equal
Total Shares (which rest on a strong presumption of human equality), and that
any of them requires foundational justification. This is a manifestation of the
age-old and largely insoluble problem of where morals come from. One can try
to derive a given moral position from some more general principles, but in the
end, all moral frameworks are quintessentially axiomatic, whether the axioms
come from Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, or God (and even in the latter case,
one must decide whose God and then which text she speaks through). Morals
are sets of axioms to which groups of people agree to be bound, for diverse and
sometimes unfathomable reasons. Victim Pays and Equal Total Shares represent
opposite poles on the spectrum of respect for human equality, with Polluter
Pays somewhere in the middle; from the standpoint of consequences for climate
protection, any point on the spectrum will do, provided the major emitters can
be persuaded to sign onto the protocol. Presumably, developing world nations
would prefer some form of Equal Shares, while the developed world would
prefer Victim Pays, at least if they can overcome the moral squeamishness of
setting aside all the principles of equality enshrined in the foundational
documents of most liberal democracies. One can increase the chances of a
global agreement by persuading developed world governments to move more in
the direction of Equal Shares, or by persuading the developing world
governments to move more in the direction of Victim Pays. I myself feel more
comfortable working to persuade developed world governments to adhere to the
principles of human equality and dignity they so often profess than I would in
trying to persuade the poor to be happy victims.
One way to judge a set of moral principles is to see what kind of actions it
could justify, and decide whether we ourselves would wish to be bound by
principles that could allow such things to come to pass. Seen in this light, Victim
Pays is an affront to most of the principles the civilized world professes to hold
dear-indeed the very principles enshrined in our own Declaration of
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Independence. 26 Any moral framework that makes us comfortable with Victim
Pays also could be used to justify slavery, racial discrimination, stealing land
from aboriginal peoples, and any number of other practices whose company
decent people would not want to keep. Victim Pays puts us in the company of
Nietzsche, while Equal Shares puts us in the company of Goethe. To bring
things closer to home, let us suppose that your wealthy neighbor opens an
electroplating plant, whose effluent contaminates the well on your property,
which is your only source of water, and renders it unusable. He, however, is
unaffected, since his water comes from a clear mountain stream higher up. You
complain, but his response is that it is you who owe him the cost of cleaning up
his plant, since you're the one who benefits from being able to use the well. We
would not tolerate such an outcome in domestic pollution law, so it is hard to
say what moral justification we have in expecting the developing world to
acquiesce to the exact analogy in carbon, writ large, when it comes to
international negotiations.
But even if we agree on human equality as a foundational principle for just
distribution of the Carbon Commons, it must be admitted that deciding just
what is meant by "equality" and whether it really demands some form of Equal
Shares remains a vexing problem, which I do not propose to solve here. Both
the deep appeal, and problematic aspects, of the notion of human equality have
been reviewed by Patrick Brennan,27 who reiterates that humans are manifestly
unequal with regard to abilities and any number of other characteristics, and few
proponents of equality would wish it upon us that everybody should become
identical, or even that all outcomes should be identical. To the contrary, there is
in general a celebration of human diversity. So what can it possibly actually mean
for humans to be equal? Herbert Spiegelberg,2 writing poignantly at a time when
the Nazi regime was visiting the worst consequences of Nietzschean inequality
on the world, arrived at the conclusion nonetheless that not all factual
inequalities should be subject to cancellation. What he finds instead is "the need
of redress for the unwarranted privileges and handicaps of our unequal stations
at birth." 29 Precisely what this redress should entail when the unequal station
arises from one individual being born more intelligent than another (and
therefore better able to make use of the fruits of a college education) is unclear.
Some forms of unequal circumstances at birth (being born black, or female, or
poor) are clearly irrelevant to the question of access to something like education
or adequate health care, and need unconditional redress. The question of
26

Decl of Ind.
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See generally Patrick M. Brennan, Arguingfor Human Equaky, 18 J L & Relig 99 (2002).
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whether a person should suffer a reduced share of the Carbon Commons simply
because she was born African or Indian falls naturally into the same category.
There is another school of thinking about equality, however, which defines
equality instead as equal access to certain fundamental capabilities (which are
themselves axiomatic). This point of view was put forth cogently by Amartya
Sen, 0 who finds severe conceptual difficulties in other means of coming to grips
with equality. The question then becomes not one of an equal share, but rather
one of an adequate share needed to enable the basic human capabilities.
Nussbaum" lists one possible (arguably minimal) set of basic human capabilities.
Would 100 tonnes of carbon emission per person be enough to provide these
capabilities? Is this list comprehensive enough to serve as a basis for
international negotiations or should it be expanded? Such considerations could
move the default just allocation dictated by Equal Shares, but it would take
much further analysis to determine the direction of the adjustment.
Finer points of moral philosophy notwithstanding, anyone arguing that
some human beings are intrinsically endowed with a right to a greater share of
the Carbon Commons (or any other scarce resource) than others should face a
high hurdle in justifying this claim. One could counter that life is unfair and it's
not our particular obligation to right all wrongs. Investment bankers are paid
more than professors and we tolerate that-after all, we did choose to be
professors. But when women and black people are paid less than white men for
the very same work, that is, in modern society, considered rank injustice, though
in historical times it might have been considered merely a "misfortune" (like the
Lisbon Earthquake) to have been born a woman or black-or a slave. Those
who argue that the developed world has no particular obligation to take on more
of a share of carbon mitigation efforts than the developing world are in essence
arguing that it is just a misfortune that the Chinese were born into a nation that
did not get to the Carbon Commons as soon as we did. Here, we should pay
heed to Shklar's admonition that the rich are very prone to finding ways to
reclassify injustice as misfortune. 3 2 It seems to me that much of the abundant
cleverness displayed in Posner and Weisbach's book3 3 is deployed to this very
end.
Much of my discussion assumes that nations and individuals will have to
accept a considerable harm or loss from actions to reduce carbon emissions.
30
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This is not actually so certain, even in the short term. In the long term one is
going to have to adapt to a world without fossil fuels at some point, since they
will surely run out-and probably sooner than we think. Prudent measures to
decarbonize the economy early and in an orderly fashion could well leave us
more prosperous and secure than business as usual.34 The alternative would
confront society with the simultaneous crises of energy scarcity and an
irretrievably wrecked climate. Nations and individuals currently seem to have
more fear of messing with the economy than of messing with the climate.
Perhaps the reason is to be found in Shklar's observation that "[w]e get angry at
and on behalf of individuals but are indifferent to wrongs that seem to affect too
many people at large." 35 In contrast to the dispersed and somewhat abstract
harms from a changing climate, economic impacts may seem very individual. If
this cognitive dissonance can be countered, and it becomes recognized that there
is a path forward that makes everybody better off and richer, then much of our
theorizing about justice based on the premise that avoiding climate change is
bitter medicine will be moot.
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